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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
vs. : 
MICHAEL DAN KERR, : Case No. 20080768-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for the crimes of Aggravated Assault, 
Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person and a Dangerous 
Weapon Penalty Enhancement. This court has jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to U.C.A. §78A-4-103(2)(e). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
POINT I 
DID THE COURT ERR IN FAILING TO MERGE THE 
DANGEROUS WEAPON ENHANCEMENT ON BOTH OF 
THE THIRD-DEGREE FELONY CHARGES TOGETHER 
WITH THE SEPARATE DANGEROUS WEAPONS 
PENALTY ENHANCEMENT? 
1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: A "merger argument is a matter of statutory 
interpretation, a legal question, which [is] reviewed for correctness." State v. 
Bluff, 52 P.3d 1210, 1223 (Utah 2002). 
The issue was properly preserved at trial through a timely objection to 
these issues by trial counsel (Tr. 105). 
POINT II 
WERE THE DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
UNDER THE CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PROVISION OF 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 9 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
VIOLATED BY THE DOUBLE ENHANCEMENT AND DID 
THIS VIOLATION CONSTITUTE PLAIN ERROR? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The issue of constitutionality is a question of law, 
and this Court should review the trial court's ruling for correctness and accord it 
no particular deference. "Since questions of constitutional rights are questions 
of law, we give no deference to the trial court's conclusion . . ." State v. 
Mitchell, 824 P.2d 469, 471 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
The issue was not properly preserved at trial, although defense counsel 
objected to the enhancements on a merger or double jeopardy standard. (Tr. 
105). Therefore, the plain error standard applies. "To establish plain error, a 
defendant must show: (1) an error did in fact occur, (2) the error should have 
been obvious to the trial court, and (3) the error is harmful. State v. Bradley, 
2 
2002 UT App 348 (See also State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah Ct.App. 
1992) and State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 334 (Utah 1993). 
POINT III 
WAS THE DEFENDANT DENIED HIS RIGHT TO 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN VIOLATION 
OF THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE 1, 
SECTIONS SEVEN AND TWELVE OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION WHEN HIS ATTORNEY FAILED TO 
OBJECT TO THE SENTENCE UNDER THE EIGHTH 
AMENDMENT AND ARTICLE 1 SECTION 9 OF THE 
UTAH CONSTITUTION.? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The Appellate Court must determine as a 
matter of fact and law whether the Defendant was denied his right to effective 
assistance of counsel. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S 668, 80 L.Ed.2d 
674 (1984), the United States Supreme Court articulated a two part test, which 
was adopted in State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990), to determine 
whether counsel was ineffective. The Court held that: 
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was 
deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so 
serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel 
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the 
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced 
the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so 
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose 
result is reliable. Id. at 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes and rules are attached in 
the addendum: 
UTAH STATUTES 
UCA. §76-1-402(3) 
UCA §76-5-103. Aggravated assault. 
UCA §76-10-503 Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person 
UCA §76-3-203 Dangerous Weapon Penalty Enhancement 
UCA§78A-4-103(2)(e) 
UTAH CONSTITUTION 
Article 1 Section 7 
Article 1 Section 9 
Article 1 Section 12 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
Fourth Amendment 
Fifth Amendment 
Sixth Amendment 
Eighth Amendment 
Fourteenth Amendment 
4 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant was charged with the offenses of Aggravated Assault, a 
third-degree felony in violation of U.C.A. §76-5-103, Possession of a Dangerous 
Weapon by a Restricted Person, a third-degree felony in violation of U.C.A. 
§76-10-503, together with a Dangerous Weapon Penalty Enhancement in 
violation of U.C.A. §76-3-203. Defendant had a bench trial in front of the 
Honorable Parley R. Baldwin on June 17, 2008. The Defendant was found guilty 
on the Aggravated Assault Charges and the Possession of a Dangerous Weapon 
by a Restricted Person together with a Dangerous Weapon Penalty Enhancement 
in violation of U.C.A. §76-3-203. On August 28, 2008, the Defendant was 
sentenced to serve consecutive terms of one to ten years on the two third-degree 
felonies, together with a 5 year to 10 year sentence on the enhancement. (R. 
195/3-4)The Defendant is currently incarcerated in the Utah State Prison. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On June 16, 2006, Mr. Brandon Hartley and Brent McKissick were 
working at the Outlaw Saloon as club security. (R. 7) That evening, Mr. Hartley 
and his boss, Mr. McKissick, were called by a two-way radio to respond to a 
fight that was occurring in the club's bathroom. (R. 8). When Mr. Hartley 
arrived to the bathroom, he observed a man sitting on the floor while Mr. Kerr 
was punching him. (R. 9) At that point, Mr. Hartley grabbed Mr. Kerr by the 
5 
arm and pinned him down to the ground until more security arrived. (R.l 1) Mr. 
Hartley then took the Defendant outside and Mr. McKissick took the other 
individual outside, separating the two in front of the entrance to the club. (R.l 2) 
Mr. Kerr was bleeding, so Mr. Hartley went inside to grab some rags for the 
bleeding while Mr. McKissick looked after Mr. Kerr. (R. 13) Mr. McKissick 
took Mr. Kerr to the north side of the building where there was less traffic and 
sat him on the grass. (R. 27) Mr. McKissick noticed that Mr. Kerr's face was 
really purple and swollen. (R. 27) After checking Mr. Kerr's pupils for reaction 
to light, Mr. Kerr began to stand up, but once told to sit back down, and he 
complied. (R. 27) Mr. McKissick then saw that the officers and paramedics pull 
into the parking lot and walked away from the Defendant for a moment to get 
the attention of the officers. (R. 28) Defendant had gotten up and begun to walk 
towards the Flying J parking lot, and Mr. McKissick told him to sit back down. 
(R. 29) Mr. McKissick walked closer to him and put his hand up to the side of 
him; and at that point, Mr. Kerr then swung his left hand and hit him in the 
cheek. (R. 29) Mr. McKissick then spotted a knife, and he and Mr. Ken' began to 
wrestle around. (R. 30) Mr. McKissick pimied Mr. Kerr belly-faced to the 
ground and obtained control of the situation. (R. 31) The knife was pointed 
toward the ground and at some time during the wrestling, Mr. McKissick 
noticed the knife blade get bent against the asphalt. (R. 31) During the 
6 
wrestling, Mr. McKissick's face was cut by the knife. (R. 31) Once Mr. 
McKissick gained further control of the situation, Mr. McKissick radioed Mr. 
Hartley to have the sheriffs come over because he had been stabbed in the face. 
(R. 31) Officer Nealy Adams and Mr. Hartley were discussing the incident 
when, Mr. McKissick called out over the two-way radio that he had been 
stabbed. (R. 14) Mr. McKissick had Mr. Kerr pinned to the ground, and Mr. 
Hartley grabbed the knife out of his hand and pulled his arm behind his back and 
placed him in an ankle lock with the help of Officer Jones applying pressure to 
Mr. Kerr's bicep. (R. 14, 31, 59) Deputy Jones then placed Mr. Kerr into 
custody. (R. 78) Deputy Jones and Officer Adams placed the knife into 
evidence, and Officer Adams then waited by Mr. Kerr until medical arrived and 
were able to examine him and take him to the jail. (R. 79-80) 
The Defendant was found guilty on the Aggravated Assault Charges and 
the Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person. Upon the 
Court's finding of guilt, the State asked the Court to look at U.C.A. §76-3-203.8 
for an enhancement of a dangerous weapon. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Defendant has the constitutional right to be free from double 
jeopardy, as set forth in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
The Defendant was denied this right when the trial court failed to merge charges 
7 
and convicted him of aggravated assault, possession of a dangerous weapon by a 
restricted person and then enhanced the sentence with the addition of a 
dangerous weapon penalty enhancement. 
The possession of a dangerous weapon is an essential element to both 
aggravated assault and possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person. 
Using a weapons enhancement is doubly enhancing the Defendant's sentence 
and that is double jeopardy, a violation of Defendant's Fifth Amendment rights. 
Furthermore the imposition of the two weapons enhancement violated the 
Defendant's constitutional right against cruel and unusual punishment as 
protected under Article 1 Section 9 of the Utah Constitution and the Eighth 
Amendment the United States Constitution. This constitutional violation is 
premised upon the fact that the legislature, after reviewing all of the 
ramifications of a possession of the weapon by a restricted person, declared the 
sentence to be 0 to 5 years in prison. By adding the two separate enhancements, 
the Defendant is being punished three times for the same crime, with a resulting 
increase of over 400% to the original sentence as enacted by the Utah State 
Legislature. Finally, the Defendant's Sixth Amendment constitutional rights to 
effective assistance of counsel were violated by counsel's failure to recognize 
and raise the cruel and unusual constitutional challenge. 
8 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO MERGE THE 
DANGEROUS WEAPON ENHANCEMENT ON BOTH OF 
THE THIRD-DEGREE FELONY CHARGES TOGETHER 
WITH THE SEPARATE DANGEROUS WEAPONS 
PENALTY ENHANCEMENT WHICH VIOLATED 
DEFENDANT'S DOUBLE JEOPARDY RIGHT. 
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution forbids multiple punishments when two offenses do 
not each require proof of an additional fact. State v. Wood, 868 P.2d 70, 
90-91 (Utah 1993)7. Put another way, when a greater offense cannot be 
proved without the lesser, conviction of the lesser may not follow 
conviction of the greater. Id. 
"[M]erger is a judicially-crafted doctrine available to protect criminal 
defendants from being twice punished for committing a single act that may 
violate more than one criminal statute. " State v. Diaz, 2002 UT App 288, J^ 17, 
55 P.3d 1131. The motivating principle behind the merger doctrine is to prevent 
violations of constitutional double jeopardy protection. This Court in State v. 
Lopez, 2004 UT App 410, f^ 8 stated "Courts apply the merger doctrine as one 
1
 Overruled on other grounds, see State v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144 
(Utah Mar. 27, 1996). 
9 
means of alleviating the concern of double jeopardy that a defendant should not 
be punished twice for the same crime." 
In State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 241 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), the Court held 
"The [statutory] prohibition on conviction for lesser-included offenses flows 
from the double jeopardy clauses of the Utah and the United States 
Constitutions." U.C.A. §76-1-402(3) provides that "[a] defendant may be 
convicted of an offense included in the offense charged but may not be 
convicted of both the offense charged and the included offense." The subsection 
further states that lesser included offenses are "established by proof of the same 
or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense 
charged." Id. Thus, "where the two crimes are 'such that the greater cannot be 
committed without necessarily having committed the lesser,' then as a matter of 
law they stand in the relationship of greater and lesser offenses, and the 
defendant cannot be convicted or punished for both." State v. Hill, 61A P.2d 96, 
97 (Utah 1983) 
In Hilly the court set forth a two-part test for determining whether a 
conviction for a second offense arising out of the same set of facts violates §76-
1-402(3), requiring a comparison of "the statutory elements of the two crimes 
[first] as a theoretical matter and [second], where necessary, by reference to the 
facts proved at trial." Id. A third part to the test was later added in State v. 
10 
McCovey. 803 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1990) which stated that in cases where the 
legislature intended a statute to be an enhancement statute, the merger doctrine 
set forth in §76-1-402(3) does not apply. 
In the instant case, it is ambiguous what the legislature intended in 
regards to the Dangerous Weapons Penalty Enhancement. The possession 
of a dangerous weapon was the sole factor in Defendants Aggravated 
Assault charge, and the Dangerous Weapon Penalty Enhancement under 
§76-3-203. There was no way to obtain the convictions of Aggravated 
Assault and Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person 
without the possession of a weapon. Accordingly, the dangerous weapon 
penalty enhancement must merge into the greater offenses of aggravated 
assault and possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person. See 
Wood, supra. 
Here, the Defendant was charged with the crime of Aggravated Assault, 
Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person in addition to a 
Dangerous Weapon Penalty Enhancement. The facts of this case show that the 
Defendant did get into an altercation with Mr. McKissick which resulted in a 
knife wound to Mr. McKissick's face. Defendant's only weapon used was a 
Leatherman-type knife. The Defendant was charged and convicted of aggravated 
assault and possession of dangerous weapon (the Leatherman knife) by a 
11 
restricted person. Each of those charges resulted in a sentence of one to five 
years. It was essential that a weapon be used in order to get the conviction of 
those crimes. Allowing a Dangerous Weapon Penalty Enhancement in violation 
of U.C.A. §74-3-2035 for the possession of a Leatherman knife is doubly 
enhancing the sentence for the possession of a tool. 
The Illinois Supreme Court defines double enhancement and stated: 
"Double enhancement exists "when a factor previously used to enhance an 
offense or penalty is again used to subject a defendant to a further enhanced 
offense or penalty." People v. Koppa, 184 IlL2d 159, 703 N.E.2d 91 (1998). 
The Illinois Supreme Court further defined the problem of double 
enhancement in People v. Karon, 422 N.E.2d 627 (111. 1981), stating: In the 
context of armed violence, the State cannot seek to enhance an offense through 
the presence of a weapon and then use the weapon as a basis for an armed 
violence charge. Id. In Karon, the trial court found an impermissible double 
enhancement because the presence of a weapon enhanced a misdemeanor 
battery offense to felony aggravated battery and additionally served as a basis 
for an armed violence charge. Id. 
The Karon court, further went on to say: "[W]here a defendant possesses 
a weapon during the commission of a felony, an armed violence charge does not 
12 
constitute improper enhancement if the elements of the predicate felony require 
no presence or use of a weapon. Id. Haron, 
Here, the crimes the Defendant was convicted of include Aggravated 
Assault, U.C.A. §76-5-103^ which explicitly lists the requirement of a 
dangerous weapon as an essential element to the crime. Next, the crime of 
Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person, U.C.A, §76-10-
503°, requires that the individual be of a restricted class and have in possession 
a dangerous weapon. Both of these crimes hinge upon whether there was a 
possession of a weapon. Further enhancing the Defendant's sentence through a 
dangerous weapon penalty enhancement is exactly what the Haron court 
defined as double enhancement. 
In a case out of the Tenth Circuit, U.S. v. Farrow, 277 F.3d 1260 (C.A.10 
(Okla.),2002), (in which the defendant robbed a grocery store with his hand in 
~ 76-5-103. Aggravated assault. 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in 
Section 76-5-102 and he: 
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection (l)(a), uses 
a dangerous weapon.... 
3
 76-10-503.Restrictions on possession, purchase, transfer, and ownership of 
dangerous weapons by certain persons. 
(a) A Category I restricted person is a person who: 
(i) has been convicted of any violent felony.... 
13 
his pocket acting like a gun) the court held that "[A]n enhancement based on 
possession of a dangerous weapon under 2B3.1(b)(2) does not result in double 
counting because possession of a dangerous weapon is not an element of the 
offense of unarmed robbery under the statute. Id. See United States v. Rucker, 
178 F.3d 1369, 1373 (10th Cir.1999) (no improper double counting of separate 
enhancement provisions when they "do not necessarily overlap, are not 
indistinct, and do not serve identical purposes"). 
The Tenth Circuit has made it clear that an enhancement for a weapon is 
permissible, as long as the weapon is not an element of the offense or overlaps. 
In the present case, the weapon enhancement directly overlaps and is an element 
in the aggravated assault and possession of a weapon by a restricted person. 
The double jeopardy provisions in both the United States and Utah 
constitutions generally prohibit the State from making repeated attempts to 
convict an individual for the same offense after jeopardy has attached...." State 
v. Harris, 2004 UT 103, <f 22, 104 P.3d 1250. "With respect to cumulative 
sentences imposed in a single trial, the Double Jeopardy Clause does no more 
than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the 
legislature intended." Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366, 103 S.Ct. 673, 74 
L.Ed.2d 535 (1983) (addressing Fifth Amendment double jeopardy claims). 
14 
In Hunter, the United States Supreme Court determined that dangerous 
weapon enhancement statutes do not violate the Fifth Amendment's prohibition 
on double jeopardy if the legislature specifically authorized cumulative 
punishment for a crime committed with a dangerous weapon. See Id. (stating 
"where two statutory provisions proscribe the 'same offense/ they are 
construed not to authorize cumulative punishments in the absence of a clear 
indication of contrary legislative intent " (quoting ff^halen v. United States, 445 
U.S. 684, 692, 100 S.Ct. 1432, 63 L.Ed.2d 715 (1980)). 
In the case at bar, the enhancement statute and legislative intent are at 
issue. U.C.A. §76-3-203.8 states (in relevant part): 
(2) If the trier of fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt that a 
dangerous weapon was used in the commission or furtherance of a 
felony, the court: 
(b) may increase by five years the maximum sentence applicable 
by law in the case of a felony of the second or third degree. 
(4) If the trier of fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt that a 
person has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment for a felony 
in which a dangerous weapon was used in the commission of or 
furtherance of the felony and that person is subsequently convicted 
of another felony in which a dangerous weapon was used in the 
commission of or furtherance of the felony, the court shall, in 
addition to any other sentence imposed including those in 
Subsection (2), impose an indeterminate prison term to be not less 
than five nor more than ten years to run consecutively and not 
concurrently. 
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Utah courts have determined that parts of this statute are clear and that the 
legislative intent was intended to enhance sentencing in which a dangerous 
weapon was used. The State v. Alfatlawi case is an example. 
In State v. Alfatlawi, 153 P.3d 804, 816 -818 (Utah App.,2006), the 
Defendant, who was charged with multiple counts of aggravated robbery and 
one count of aggravated burglary, claimed he was punished twice for a single act 
- the use of a dangerous weapon in the commission of his crimes when the court 
used a dangerous weapon enhancement, and further violated his right against 
double jeopardy. 
This Court disagreed and determined that the dangerous weapon 
enhancement statute does not violate Defendant's right against double jeopardy. 
This Court stated that Hunter requires us to consider whether the legislature 
intended for the dangerous weapon enhancement to impose cumulative 
punishments. See id. We determine that the legislature did so intend. " fc[W]here 
the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, we do not look beyond the 
language's plain meaning to divine legislative intent.' "State v. Kenison, 2000 
UT App 322, If 10, 14 P.3d 129 (quoting State v. Tryba, 2000 UT App 230, \ 13, 
8 P.3d 274). Therefore, "[o]nly when we find ambiguity in the statute's plain 
language need we seek guidance from the legislative history and relevant policy 
considerations." Id. (quoting Nelson v. Salt Lake County, 905 P.2d 872, 875 
(Utah 1995)). 
The plain language of §76-3-203.8 states that u[i]f the trier of fact finds 
beyond a reasonable doubt that a dangerous weapon was used in the commission 
or furtherance of a felony, the court ... shall increase by one year the minimum 
term of the sentence applicable by law." Utah Code Ann. §76-3-203.8(2). This 
Court further went on to say "We believe this language unambiguously states 
that the legislature intended to make it mandatory for trial courts to increase 
prison terms where the jury determined beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant used a dangerous weapon while committing a felony. As a result, the 
dangerous weapon enhancement statute complies with the requirements of 
Hunter and does not violate the Fifth Amendment." State v. Alfatlawi, 153 P.3d 
804. 
This court held and recognized that the plain language of U.C.A. §76-3-
203.8(2) is clear and that an enhancement is constitutional when looking at 
subsection (2); however, looking at subsection (4), it is ambiguous as to whether 
an enhancement is intended by the legislature when the possession of a weapon 
is an essential element of the offense. 
In the case at bar, Defendant was convicted and sentenced for crimes in 
which a necessary element was the possession of a dangerous weapon. The 
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statute states that the enhancement can be applied even if the use of a dangerous 
weapon was used in the furtherance of the commission of a felony. However, 
nowhere in the statute does it permit an enhancement for a weapon possession 
when the possession is the sole element of the underlying crime. 
The application of the weapons enhancement statute to a weapons offense 
is clearly redundant. The statutory scheme set forth by the Utah Legislature has 
established a weapons enhancement statute that specifically defines additional 
penalty when a weapon is used in the commission or furtherance of a felony. 
The Utah Legislature has also made it a felony to possess a weapon if you are a 
restricted person. The application of the enhancement statute to that particular 
offense simply makes no sense. The operative language of UCA §76-3-203.8(4) 
states, "If the trier of fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt that a person is 
subsequently convicted of another felony in which a dangerous weapon was 
used in the commission of or furtherance of the felony," that the additional 
weapons enhancement statute applies. The troubling language is the redundancy 
of the use of a dangerous weapon in the commission of a dangerous weapon 
felony. This would be akin to increasing the statutory penalty for the use of the 
check in a forged check offense, the use of a car in the commission of an auto 
theft, or the use of a prescription pad in the commission of a forged prescription 
offense. The redundancy of the language simply does not make any sense. 
1 Q 
It cannot be assumed that the legislature intended for this particular 
weapons enhancement to be utilized in a weapons possession case because 
this would subsume the language of the possession of a weapon by a 
restricted person statute, and render it surplusage, in violation of the 
precept of statutory construction that courts give effect to each statutory 
term and presume that the legislature enacted them all advisedly, e.g., 
Burns v. Boy den, 2006 UT 14, % 19, 133 P.3d 370. It is this redundancy that 
was recognized by the court in People v. Haron, All N.E.2d 627 (111. 1981), 
where the court refused to apply a weapon enhancement to a weapon charge. 
Defendant is serving his sentence for aggravated assault and possession of 
a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, further enhancing that sentence by 
applying the dangerous weapons enhancement is doubly charging Defendant 
and is a violation of his Fifth Amendment right to be free from double jeopardy. 
POINT II 
THE DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS UNDER 
THE CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PROVISION OF ARTICLE I, 
SECTION 9 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION WERE 
VIOLATED BY THE DOUBLE ENHANCEMENT AND 
THIS VIOLATION CONSTITUTED PLAIN ERROR. 
The United States Supreme Court, in the case of Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 
277 (1983) recognized that the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and 
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unusual punishment limits the length of sentence as well as prohibiting a 
barbaric sentence. In Solem v. Helm, the Court held: 
In sum, we hold as a matter of principle that a criminal sentence 
must be proportionate to the crime for which the defendant has 
been convicted. {Id. at 290) 
The Court reversed a life sentence without the possibility of parole for an 
individual that had been convicted of a seventh non-violent felony. It is 
instructive to note that the Court in Solem v. Helm declared unconstitutional that 
sentence in light of the fact that the defendant was convicted of "uttering a 'no 
account' check for $100." {Id. at 281) 
Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court tempered, to some extent, the 
proportionality analysis in the case of Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003). 
In that case the Court allowed a 25-year sentence to stand against a defendant 
with an extensive criminal record under the new California "three strikes you're 
out" legislation. Ewing was sentenced to 25 years prison for the theft of $1,200 
of golf equipment. The Court, however, in still recognizing the proportionality 
doctrine noted that the defendant had a "long serious criminal record", 
"including robbery and three residential burglaries." {Id. at 30). 
The Utah Supreme Court has traditionally held that it may review a 
constitutional provision independent of the treatment by the United States Court 
of a similar federal constitutional provision. In the case of State v. Larocco, 794 
P.2d 460, 465 (Utah 1990/ the Utah Supreme Court stated; 
In State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1988), this court explained 
that because of the similarity between Article I, Section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution, we have not in the past drawn any distinctions 
between the protections respectively afforded by them. Id. at 1221. 
We then noted, however, that "we have by no means ruled out the 
possibility of doing so in some future case" since "choosing to give 
the Utah Constitution a somewhat different construction may prove 
to be an appropriate method for insulating this state's citizens from 
the vagaries of inconsistent interpretations given to the Fourth 
Amendment by the federal courts." (Id. at n. 8. emphasis added) 
This separate application has been utilized in Article I Section 9 of the 
Utah Constitution. In the case of State v. Gardner, 947 P.2d 631 ( Utah 1997) 
the Court was presented with a case wherein the defendant requested a 
constitutional ruling on this section. The Court issued a lengthy opinion 
thoroughly analyzing, comparing, and to some extent distinguishing Article I 
Section 9 of the Utah Constitution from the Eighth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution. Article I Section 9 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not be 
imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishment be inflicted. 
4
 Called into question on other grounds in the case of State v. Anderson 910 P2d 
1290 (Utah 1996). This question has now been resolved consistently with 
Larocco in the U.S. Supreme Court decision of Arizona v. Gant 129 S.Ct. 1710 
129 S.Ct. 1710,2009 WL 1045962. 
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Persons arrested or in prison shall not be treated with unnecessary 
rigor. 
State v. Gardner dealt with a treatment of the former §76-5-103.5(2)(b) of the 
Utah Code which provided that an aggravated assault by a prisoner serving a 
first-degree felony was guilty of a capital offense. The Court declared that 
statute unconstitutional on its face. Justice Durham, writing the plurality 
decision held that Article I Section 9 requires "that the legislative power to 
prescribe punishment for criminals must be circumscribed by the principle of 
proportionality." State v. Gardner id at 633. Justice Durham's position 
regarding a plain language of that constitutional provision was that it suggested, 
"that a punishment, to avoid being unconstitutionally cruel, may not be 
excessive or grossly disproportionate to the crime it is designed to punish." State 
v. Gardner id at 633. 
The Court in Gardner made an extensive analysis of the United States 
Supreme Court interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, as well as various 
States' interpretations of their individual constitutions with language similar to 
those contained in the Constitution of the State of Utah. After a careful 
consideration of the opinion of the various courts in these other jurisdictions, the 
Court held: 
I would likewise hold that a disproportionately harsh punishment 
may be unconstitutionally cruel or unusual under Article I Section 9 
00 
of the Utah Constitution, but would base this holding on the 
widespread acceptance of proportionality analysis in interpreting 
cruel and unusual punishments clauses in other states' constitutions 
and the expressed intention of Utah's constitutional delegates that 
the citizens of Utah should share the same inherent inalienable 
rights as the citizens of other states, (id at 638) 
The Utah Supreme Court recognized the Court's general desire to find 
legislatively enacted statutes to be constitutional. However, the Supreme Court 
also recognized its constitutionally mandated position to regulate those 
legislative enactments within the bounds of the Constitution. The Court in 
Gardner, in examining the proportionality and particularly the legislative intent 
to punish certain categories of criminals in a harsher manner, held: 
The State's reference to the violent conditions existing in prison 
populations cannot justify a dramatic sentence enhancement that 
also applies in non-prison situations. Furthermore, concerns about 
the danger presented to society do nothing to explain why an 
assault by a prisoner serving a sentence for a first-degree felony 
should lead to a capital conviction when the identical assault would 
be classified as merely a second degree felony, punishable by a 
sentence of one to 15 years, if committed by a prisoner serving a 
sentence for a crime other than a first-degree felony. (Id at 641) 
Although the Court recognized the constitutionality of a one-degree 
enhancement, the Court could not constitutionally validate a three-degree 
enhancement. The Court in State v. Gardner stated, "by enhancing the 
punishment for aggravated assault from a third-degree felony to a capital felony, 
the capital punishment provisions of §76-5-103.5(2)(b) is considerably harsher 
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than the enhancements provided for unquestionably more aggravating 
circumstances contained in other statutes of our criminal code." (Id at 644). The 
Utah Supreme Court cited the U.S. Supreme Court decisions of Furman v. 
Georgia, 408 U. S. 238 (1972) which required aggravating factors for capital 
homicide, as well as Coker v. Georgia, 433 US 584 (1977) which ruled that 
capital punishment for rape was unconstitutional. The Court in State v. Gardner 
ruled; 
Finally, a majority of this court concludes that the death penalty for 
aggravated assault by a prisoner is "excessive" in that it is "grossly 
out of proportion to the severity of the crime" (id at 652, citing 
Coker v. Georgia, 433 US 584 (1977)) 
In a memorandum, and unpublished decision in the case of State v. 
Rivera, 2003 Utah App 169 Case No. 20020397-CA this Court was asked to 
look at the constitutionality of the double enhancement, but declined to do so on 
the basis that the defendant had not properly preserved that issue in the trial 
court. In the case of State v. South, 932 P.2d 622, 627 (Utah Ct. App. 1977), the 
Court recognized that the enhancement was an element of the offense and must 
be determined by the trier of fact at trial. And in the case of State v. Stromberg, 
783 P.2d 54 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) the Court upheld the constitutionality of a one 
degree enhancement for the drug-free zone. The Court in holding that the one-
degree enhancement was constitutional stated: 
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As discussed previously, an enhanced penalty will not be held 
unconstitutional if the legislative classification is not arbitrarily 
drawn and rests upon a rational distinction. See State v. Clark, 632 
P.2d 841, 843-44 (Utah 1981); see also Moore, 782 P.2d at 502 
(legislature may enhance criminal penalties for specific conduct in 
its discretion). Indeed, "[i]t is not unconstitutional for a state to 
impose a more severe penalty for a particular type of crime than 
the penalty which is imposed with respect to the general category 
of crimes to which the special crime is related or of which it is a 
subcategory." (State v. Stromberg at 60) 
However it must be remembered that the Gardner case was decided after 
Stromberg, and declared a three-degree enhancement unconstitutional. The 
difference is the proportionality issue discussed in the Gardner decision. 
In the present case, as discussed above, we have a situation where the 
Defendant is being doubly enhanced under law, but in reality is receiving a triple 
punishment for the possession of a weapon. First, he is being punished on a 
third-degree felony for the possession of a weapon by the restricted person. The 
first enhancement (second punishment) is the increase of the sentence from a 0 
to 5 year sentence up to a 1 to 10 year prison sentence. Finally, the second 
enhancement (third punishment) for the use of the weapon resulted in a separate 
consecutive 5 to 10 year prison sentence, with a total sentence of 6 to 20 years in 
prison. 
It is this second enhancement which the Defendant believes violates the 
constitutional provisions discussed above as applied by the Gardner decision. 
The proportionality violation of sentence in this particular case, as applied 
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particularly to the possession of a weapon by a restricted person, (as well as the 
aggravated assault) is a resulting 6 to 20 year prison sentence in a crime for 
which the legislature pronounced a 0 to 5 year prison sentence. The difficulty of 
this enhanced sentence is that the legislature knew when they passed the original 
possession of a weapon by a restricted person, that a dangerous weapon, by 
definition, had to be present in order for a defendant to be convicted of the 
charge. Knowing this fact, the legislature enacted a statute which prescribed a 0 
to 5 year prison sentence. It is the misapplication and unconstitutionality of the 
enhancement statutes that raise this sentence by over 400%. 
"To establish plain error, a defendant must show: (1) an error did in fact 
occur, (2) the error should have been obvious to the trial court, and (3) the error 
is harmful. State v. Bradley, 2002 UT App 348 (See also State v. Ellifritz, 835 
P.2d 170, 174 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) In the case of State v. Ohen, 869 P.2d 
1004, 1010 (Utah App. 1994) this Court held "Under [the plain error] standard, 
we will not reverse unless we determine that an error existed, and that the error 
was both obvious and harmful". The Court further ruled "An error is hannful if 
the likelihood of a different result is 'sufficiently high to undermine confidence 
in the verdict"5 (Id at 1010) 
The first prong of the plain error test is showing that an error occurred. As 
discussed above, the Defendant has been sentenced to two terms of 6 to 20 years 
on two third-degree felony charges. This is a violation of the Defendant's 
constitutional rights. The second prong of the plain error test is that the error 
must have been obvious to the trial court. In the present case there was extensive 
discussion by trial counsel about the unfairness and excessive nature of the 
sentence being imposed. (R. 194/105) Although trial counsel raised the merger/ 
double jeopardy argument, trial counsel failed to raise the cruel and unusual 
punishment argument. The fact that this matter was even raised to the trial court 
should have elicited some consideration by the sentencing court of the 
constitutional implications under the Eighth Amendment and Article 1 Section 
9. 
The final prong of the plain error test is that the error was harmful. Under 
the circumstances that is a given. Defendant has been sentenced to a term of 6 to 
20 years on both third-degree felony charges. In the event the trial court 
eliminated one or both of the enhancements that sentence would be either be 0 to 
5 years in prison or a 1 to 10 year prison term, which are significantly less than 
the sentence imposed on the defendant. 
POINT III 
THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN VIOLATION 
OF THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE 1, 
SECTIONS SEVEN AND TWELVE OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION WHEN HIS ATTORNEY FAILED TO 
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OBJECT TO THE SENTENCE UNDER THE EIGHTH 
AMENDMENT AND ARTICLE 1 SECTION 9 OF THE 
UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "the right to 
counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel." Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 692 (1984). In Strickland, the 
Supreme Court established a two-part test to determine whether counsel's 
assistance was ineffective. "First, the defendant must show that counsel's 
performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so 
serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the 
defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 687, 
80L.Ed.2dat693. 
In the case of Kimmelman v. Morrrison, All U.S. 365 (1986), the Court 
was presented with a case where defense counsel, due to a failure to conduct 
proper discovery, did not timely file a motion to suppress evidence under the 
Fourth Amendment. The Court of Appeals reversed his conviction under an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The Supreme Court affirmed that 
reversal. In that affirmation of reversal the Court stated: 
Where defense counsel's failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment 
claim competently is the principal allegation of ineffectiveness, the 
defendant must also prove that his Fourth Amendment claim is 
meritorious and that there is a reasonable probability that the 
verdict would have been different absent the excludable evidence 
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in order to demonstrate actual prejudice. {Kimmelman v. 
Morrrison, All U.S. 365, 375 (1986)) 
In making the determination that trial counsel's conduct failed to comport with 
constitutional requirements, the Court held: 
In this case, however, we deal with a total failure to conduct pretrial 
discovery, and one as to which counsel offered only implausible 
explanations. Counsel's performance at trial, while generally 
creditable enough, suggests no better explanation for this apparent 
and pervasive failure to "make reasonable investigations or to make 
a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations 
unnecessary." [citation omitted] Under these circumstances, 
although the failure of the District Court and the Court of Appeals 
to examine counsel's overall performance was inadvisable, we 
think this omission did not affect the soundness of the conclusion 
both courts reached — that counsel's performance fell below the 
level of reasonable professional assistance in the respects alleged. 
{Kimmelman v. Morrrison, 411 U.S. 365, 386 (1986)) 
In the case of State v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), the 
Court found that the failure of trial counsel to object to a Fourth Amendment 
violation constituted error, as well as established reversible ineffective 
assistance of counsel. In that case, the Court applied the Strickland test to a 
situation where defense counsel had in a pretrial motion moved to suppress 
evidence on the basis of an illegal search. The trial court denied that motion 
based upon evidence at a preliminary hearing. During trial the officer altered his 
testimony establishing the lack of plain view, yet trial counsel did not re-raise 
the motion to suppress. The Court held that "where a defendant can show that 
there was no conceivable legitimate tactical basis for counsel's deficient actions, 
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the first prong of Strickland is satisfied." (Id. at 976, quoting State v. Snyder, 
860 P.2d 351, 359 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)) 
Defense counsel's error in the present case was glaringly obvious to any 
observer. Her failure to object to and raise an Article 1 Section 9 and Eighth 
Amendment claim to the double enhancement which raised the Defendant's 
sentence 400% clearly showed a deficiency. In Kimmelman v. Morrison infra. 
the court found reversible error in a case where trial counsel realized a Fourth 
Amendment issue, but brought it to the court's attention in an untimely manner. 
That untimely motion alone constituted reversible error. In State v. Gallegos 
infra., the court found error in trial counsel's failure to renew a previously 
denied motion to suppress. In the present case, counsel, as in Kimmelman, raised 
one issue writ in regard to the enhancement (the merger/double jeopardy 
argument) but totally failed to recognize and raise the more compelling Eighth 
Amendment claim. 
Furthermore, "Counsel's performance at trial... suggests no better 
explanation for this apparent and pervasive failure." {Kimmelman) To the 
contrary, there is absolutely no conceivable reason for defense counsel not to 
make an objection to the clearly excessive sentence the defendant received. 
The second prong of the two-part test articulated in Strickland is "the 
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. 
This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the 
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693. 
In Strickland, the Court held that "[t]he purpose of the Sixth Amendment 
guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a defendant has the assistance necessary to 
justify reliance on the outcome of the proceeding." In State \\ Templin, 805 
P.2d 182 (Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme Court held that to meet the second part 
of the Strickland test a defendant "must show that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. at 187(quoting 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)). In making the 
determination that counsel was ineffective, the appellate court should "consider 
the totality of the evidence, taking into account such factors as whether the 
errors affect the entire evidentiary picture or have an isolated effect and how 
strongly the verdict is supported by the record." Id. 
Likewise, in the case of State v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973, 981 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1998), the court found prejudicial error in failing to object to the admission 
of a tin canister that contained drugs, which was found during an illegal search. 
In that case the court held: "Because the evidence found in the tin was essential 
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to the State's case on [drug possession] charges, admission of that evidence was 
obviously prejudicial to defendant." 
In the present case5 the error by defense counsel is absolutely quantifiable 
by the increase in sentence. If This Court determines that the double 
enhancement (triple sentence) violated the Utah and Federal Constitutional 
provisions for cruel and unusual punishment, the result is not in question. 
When the totality of the circumstances is considered it is clear that the 
Defendant did not receive the type of assistance necessary to justify confidence 
in the outcome of the Defendant's representation. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing reasons, the Defendant respectfully requests the 
dangerous weapons penalty enhancement either be declared unconstitutional and 
reversed and his sentence modified. 
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ADDENDUM A 
1A 
76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal episode — Included 
offenses. 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense charged but 
may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included offense. An offense is 
so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish 
the commission of the offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of preparation to commit 
the offense charged or an offense otherwise included therein; or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense. 
76-5-103. Aggravated assault. 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in Section 
76-5-102 and he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or 
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection (l)(a), uses a 
dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other means or force likely to 
produce death or serious bodily injury. 
(2) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a second degree felony. 
(3) A violation of Subsection (l)(b) is a third degree felony. 
76-10-503. Restrictions on possession, purchase, transfer, and ownership of 
dangerous weapons by certain persons. 
(1) For purposes of this section: 
(a) A Category I restricted person is a person who: 
(i) has been convicted of any violent felony as defined in Section 76-3-203.5; 
(ii) is on probation or parole for any felony; 
(iii) is on parole from a secure facility as defined in Section 62A-7-101: or 
(iv) within the last ten years has been adjudicated delinquent for an offense which if 
committed by an adult would have been a violent felony as defined in Section 76-3-
203.5. 
(b) A Category II restricted person is a person who: 
(i) has been convicted of or is under indictment for any felony; 
(ii) within the last seven years has been adjudicated delinquent for an offense which if 
committed by an adult would have been a felony; 
(iii) is an unlawful user of a controlled substance as defined in Section 58-37-2; 
(iv) is in possession of a dangerous weapon and is knowingly and intentionally in 
unlawful possession of a Schedule I or II controlled substance as defined in Section 58-
37-2; 
(v) has been found not guilty by reason of insanity for a felony offense; 
(vi) has been found mentally incompetent to stand trial for a felony offense; 
(vii) has been adjudicated as mentally defective as provided in the Brady Handgun 
Violence Prevention Act Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993), or has been 
committed to a mental institution; 
(viii) is an alien who is illegally or unlawfully in the United States; 
(ix) has been dishonorably discharged from the armed forces; or 
(x) has renounced his citizenship after having been a citizen of the United States. 
(2) A Category I restricted person who intentionally or knowingly agrees, consents, 
offers, or arranges to purchase, transfer, possess, use, or have under his custody or 
control, or who intentionally or knowingly purchases, transfers, possesses, uses, or has 
under his custody or control: 
(a) any firearm is guilty of a second degree felony; or 
(b) any dangerous weapon other than a firearm is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(3) A Category II restricted person who purchases, transfers, possesses, uses, or has 
under his custody or control: 
(a) any firearm is guilty of a third degree felony; or 
(b) any dangerous weapon other than a firearm is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(4) A person may be subject to the restrictions of both categories at the same time. 
(5) If a higher penalty than is prescribed in this section is provided in another section 
for one who purchases, transfers, possesses, uses, or has under this custody or control any < 
dangerous weapon, the penalties of that section control. 
(6) It is an affirmative defense to a charge based on the definition in Subsection 
(1 )(b)(iv) that the person was: 
(a) in possession of a controlled substance pursuant to a lawful order of a practitioner 
for use of a member of the person's household or for administration to an animal owned 
by the person or a member of the person's household; or 
(b) otherwise authorized by law to possess the substance. 
76-3-203. Felony conviction — Indeterminate term of imprisonment. 
A person who has been convicted of a felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for 
an indeterminate term as follows: 
(1) In the case of a felony of the first degree, unless the statute provides otherwise, for 
a term of not less than five years and which may be for life. 
(2) In the case of a felony of the second degree, unless the statute provides otherwise, 
for a term of not less than one year nor more than 15 years. 
(3) In the case of a felony of the third degree, unless the statute provides otherwise, for 
a term not to exceed five years. 
78A-4-103. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a 
conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony; 
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UTAH CONSTITUTION 
Article I, Section 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. 
Article I, Section 9. [Excessive bail and fines -- Cruel punishments.] 
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not be imposed; nor shall 
cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be 
treated with unnecessary rigor. 
Article I, Section 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in 
person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to 
have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against 
him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, 
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the 
offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money 
or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give 
evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor 
a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same 
offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the function 
of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists unless 
otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of 
reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any 
preliminary examination to determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with 
respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by 
statute or rule. 
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UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
FOURTH AMENDMENT - Search and Seizure 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
FIFTH AMENDMENT - Rights of Persons 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval 
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger: nor shall 
any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor 
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation. 
SIXTH AMENDMENT - Rights of Accused in Criminal Prosecutions 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, 
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained b} law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have 
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
EIGHTH AMENDMENT - Further Guarantees in Criminal Cases 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted. 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT - Rights Guaranteed Privileges and Immunities of 
Citizenship, Due Process and Equal Protection 
Section. 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities 
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
Section. 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to 
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding 
Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for 
President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the 
Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is 
denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and 
citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, 
or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion 
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens 
twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Section. 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of 
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United 
States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of 
Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or 
as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United 
States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or 
comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, 
remove such disability. 
Section. 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, 
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing 
insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any 
State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or 
rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; 
but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Section. 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article. 
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
MICHAEL DAN KERR, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
APP SENTENCING 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 0619 02954 FS 
Judge: PA.RLEY R BALDWIN 
Date: August 28, 2 008 
PRESENT * CUtJ® 
Clerk: debbieg 
Prosecutor: MILES, BRANDEN B 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): GUSTIN, SUSANNE 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: May 21, 19 64 
Video 
Tape Number: 3D082808 Tape Count: 9:35-9:42 
CHARGES 
1. AGGRAVATED ASSAULT (amended) - 3rd Degree F e l o n y 
P l e a : Not G u i l t y - D i s p o s i t i o n : 0 6 / 1 7 / 0 8 G u i l t y 
2 . POSSESSION OF A DNGR WEAP BY RESTRICTED - 3 r d Degree F e l o n y 
P l e a : Not G u i l t y - D i s p o s i t i o n : 0 6 / 1 7 / 0 8 G u i l t y 
3 . DANGEROUS WEAPON PENALTY ENHANCEMENT - Not A p p l i c a b l e 
- D i s p o s i t i o n : 0 6 / 1 7 / 0 8 G u i l t y 
HEARING 
T h i s i s t ime s e t f o r s e n t e n c i n g . Defendant i s p r e s e n t i n c u s t o d y 
and i s r e p r e s e n t e d by Suanne G u s t i n , p r i v a t e c o u n s e l . Counse l 
a d d r e s s t h e c o u r t . Court p r o c e e d s wi th s e n t e n c i n g . 
Sentence, Judgment, Commitment 
Cr)?AAQP>F>RA pages: 
Case "No: 061902954 
Date: Aug 28, 200 8 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ASSAULT a 3rd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
from 1 to 10 years in the Utah State Prison, 
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSSESSION OF A DNGR WEAP BY 
RESTRICTED a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant: is sentenced to 
1 to 10 years in the Utah State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of DANGEROUS WEAPON PENALTY 
ENHANCEMENT a Not Applicable, the defendant is sentenced to 
5 to 10 years in the Utah State Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
The Court recommends a concurrent sentence as to count 1 and 2 with 
count 3 to run consecutively as the statute orders . 
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE 
The Court recommends credit for time served while in the Weber 
County Jail. 
Case No: 061902954 
D a t e : Aug 28 , 2 0 0* 
D a t e d t h i s day of -_> 
M S Y R B M S W I N 
l/i / 
D i s t r i c t Cour t J u d g e 
